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James Wilson’s Judge as  
Agent-Plus
Geena Bournazian
ames Wilson’s theory of constitutional interpretation is based on a multi-
dimensional view of sovereignty, both principled and derived. While the 
American people serve as the principle sovereign, they delegate authority 
to the Court (their agents) to uphold the Constitution and educate the 
American people about the Constitution, its principles, and the duties of 
the sovereign people. In rendering their decisions, Wilson argues that judges should 
apply principles of common sense natural law and natural right that informed the 
sovereign people’s original understanding of the Constitution.  By applying Wil-
son’s multidimensional concept of sovereignty, the role of the judge can be used as 
a guide to understanding Wilson’s overall theory of constitutional interpretation. 
According to Wilson (2007, 304), a constitution is 
that supreme law, made or ratified by those in whom sovereign 
power of the state resides, which prescribes the manner, according 
to which the state wills that government should be instituted and 
administered. From this constitution the power of government must 
be directed and controlled: of this constitution no alteration can be 
made by government; because such an alteration would destroy the 
foundation of its own authority.
Wilson’s definition of a constitution relies upon the idea of sovereignty as 
a multi-dimensional concept, based on a principle-agent relationship. The 
Constitution is the supreme law. The people, as principle sovereign, both 
make the Constitution, and will their power to the agents of the government 
which they have created. These agents are designed to pursue the will of the 
people, and limited by the division of powers, and the boundaries set in the 
Constitution, in order to prevent tyranny. According to this logic, a judge 
serves as an agent of the people. A judge is to represent the wants and interests 
of the people. However, the nature of a judge cannot be treated the same as 
the nature of a representative in Congress. Representatives in Congress are 
supposed to be the most accurate voice of the people, with little or no altera-
tion. Judges, on the other hand, are entrusted with the job of upholding the 
Constitution, while simultaneously educating the people on the law. There-
fore, they can be considered as agents-plus. Judges serve as both an agent and 
educator of the principle sovereign, aiding the people in understanding their 
position as principle sovereign. Judges help educate the people to make them 
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better citizens through their decision making and interpreta-
tion of the Constitution (Zink 2009). 
Here, I address Wilson’s conception of judges as an agents-plus 
in three different roles. The first role is as agents. Judges are 
not to serve as political agents, in order to preserve the proper 
balance between the three branches of government. Wilson 
stresses the importance of an independent judiciary in com-
pleting the duties necessary of judges. Wilson also believes that 
as agents, judges should rely on scientific reasoning when mak-
ing their decisions. The second role is as representatives. Wil-
son designates three jobs for judges as a representative: (1) Not 
to make law, but to interpret it in light of the Constitution, 
(2) To promote a true science of law and to follow precedent 
grounded on scientific principles instead of Aristotelian pru-
dence, and (3) Judicial review must be textually based. The 
third role is as educators. According to Wilson, judges have 
the social responsibility of educating the people (the principle 
sovereign) through their judicial decisions. This education not 
only clarifies the Constitution and the law, but also serves to 
educate the people about the nature of their responsibilities as 
principle sovereign. Included in this is Wilson’s concept of the 
moral sentiment, and its relationship with reason (the science 
of law). Wilson clarifies this relationship with his idea of judg-
ment and its relationship with reflection, memory, and reason.
Judges as Agents
Since judges are representatives of the people, it is important 
that they are independent from the other branches of govern-
ment. Wilson (2007, 704) argues that the Courts “ought to be 
completely independent… They should be removed from the 
most distant apprehension of being affected, in their judicial 
character and capacity, by anything, except their own behavior 
and consequences.” Important to Wilson is that judges are not 
political agents. Where the executive and legislative branches 
have popularly elected members, either directly or indirectly, 
they become political agents that are restrained by the will of 
the people. This forces political agents to change their platform 
according to trends in the general populace. Since Supreme 
Court judges are appointed for life, they do not have concern 
with reelection, and therefore can make their decisions accord-
ing to the Constitution. This does not mean that judges are not 
agents of the people, it simply means that they are held above 
the fray of politics, and serve only to protect the Constitution, 
which is the original expression of the people’s will. Wilson 
asks:
Can dignity and independence be expected from 
judges, who are liable to be tossed about by every 
veering gale of politics, and who can be secured from 
destruction, only by dexterously swimming along with 
every successive tide of party? Is there not reason to 
fear, that in such a situation, the decisions of courts 
would cease to be the voice of law and justice, and 
would become the echo of faction and violence? 
(Wilson 2007, 704-05)
The independence of the courts is crucial to maintaining a 
boundary between not only the three branches, but between 
the courts and politics. Since the Court is not supposed to be 
a political body, its authority and power is very constricted. 
Hamilton describes this issue stating “The judiciary, on the 
contrary, has no influence over the sword or the purse; no di-
rection either of the strength or of the wealth of society; and 
can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to 
have neither force nor will, but merely judgment; and must ul-
timately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the 
efficacy of its judgments” (Federalist #78, 402). The Court’s 
authority relies upon the Constitution, rather than the current 
politics of society. This jurisdiction allows for judges to take on 
the responsibility of maintaining the Constitution, and most 
importantly, maintaining the boundaries between the three 
branches.
Maintaining these boundaries is one of the Supreme Court’s 
most important jobs. Wilson (2007, 705) states “Liberty and 
security in government depend not on the limits, which the 
rulers may please to assign to the exercise of their own powers, 
but on the boundaries, within which their powers are circum-
scribed by the constitution.” The enforcement of boundaries 
ensures that government will not become tyrannical. The most 
important boundary to enforce is between the judicial and the 
legislative departments. Wilson (2007. 743) argues “In con-
sequence of it, the bounds of the legislative power – a power 
the most apt to overleap its bounds – are not only distinctly 
marked in the system itself; but effectual and permanent provi-
sion is made, that every transgression of those bounds shall be 
adjudged and rendered vain and fruitless.”Using the power of 
judicial review, the Court can strike down a law if it conflicts 
with the Constitution. This allows the judiciary to maintain 
this boundary between the two branches. Wilson (2007, 743) 
explains when he states “This regulation is far from throwing 
any disparagement upon the legislative authority of the United 
States. It does not confer upon the judicial department a power 
superior, in its general nature, to that of the legislature; but it 
confers upon it, in particular instances, and for particular pur-
poses, the power of declaring and enforcing the superior power 
of the constitution – the supreme law of the land.”According 
to Wilson, an act should be declared unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court if it violates the spheres of power (on an insti-
tutional level), or if it usurps power for the legislature. James 
Madison shares the same sentiment on the maintenance of 
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boundaries in order to prevent the usurpation of power by an-
other branch. Madison discusses tyranny as “the accumulation 
of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same 
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether heredi-
tary, self-appointed, or elective” (Federalist #47, 249). In addi-
tion to the threat of tyranny, Madison discusses the concept of 
factions in a majoritarian society. Madison states “the society 
itself will be broken into many parts, interests, and classes of 
citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will 
be in little danger from interested combinations of the major-
ity” (Federalist #51, 270). One of Madison’s biggest fears was 
the creation of a majority faction. The division of power, and 
the maintenance and enforcement of those divisions prevents 
against majority faction, and protects the interests of the mi-
nority. The enforcement of boundaries serves to maintain the 
Constitution is and always will be the supreme law, in which 
no branch of government can infringe upon.
In the case where the Constitution does not provide clear guid-
ance, or consists of conflicting protections, judges should be 
entrusted to make equitable decisions. Wilson relies upon Ar-
istotle’s definition of equity, which is “the correction of that, 
in which the law is defective, by being too general” (Wilson 
2007, 924). According to Wilson’s understanding, the science 
of law is used to educate a judge on justice and equity. Wilson 
responds to arguments calling for separate courts of law and 
equity by arguing that equity is an inherent aspect and con-
cern of the law and that the two cannot be separated. Wilson 
(2007,925) critiques the British system, stating “When we find 
a court of law and a court of equity placed in contradistinction 
to each other, how natural is it to conclude, that the former 
decide without equity, and that the latter decides without law. 
Such a conclusion, however, is greatly erroneous.” He describes 
the combination of a court of equity and a court of law when 
interpreting constitutional issues stating:
It has, indeed, been said, concerning a court of equity, 
that it determines by the spirit, and not by the letter 
of a rule.  But ought not this to be said concerning a 
court of law likewise? Is not each equally bound – does 
not each profess itself to be equally bound – to ex-
plain the law according to the intention of those, who 
made it? In the interpretation of laws, whether strictly 
or liberally, there is not a single maxim, which is not 
adopted, in the same manner, and with the same force, 
by both courts. Hitherto, then, we find no difference 
between a court of law and a court of equity. (Wilson 
2007, 925)  
Although others have tried to make the argument that courts 
of equity and law should remain separate entities, Wilson does 
not agree. Wilson (2007, 933-34) states “law and equity are 
in a state of continual progression; one occupying incessantly 
the ground, which the other, in its advancement, has left. The 
posts now possessed by strict law were formerly possessed by 
equity; and the posts now possessed by equity will hereafter be 
possessed by strict law.” Here, Wilson appears to separate law 
and equity on the one hand, and science on the other. Science 
is grounded and proven, and informed by reason. This supports 
the theory of Hobbes, who believes scientific reasoning should 
be applied to the law. Hobbes (1994, 26) says “reason is the 
pace; increase of science, the way; and the benefit of mankind, 
the end.” This suggests that both Hobbes and Wilson believe 
the use of scientific reasoning is the driving force which should 
solidify the law, justice and equity. For Wilson, applying sci-
entific reasoning with equity helps to aid judges in translating 
the Constitution while simultaneously improving society. This 
idea of equity is also consistent with Hobbes. Hobbes defines 
equity in the role of a judge as “a precept of the law of natural 
that he deal equally between them. For without that, the con-
troversies of men cannot be determined but by war” (Hobbes 
1994, 97). In a similar sentiment, Wilson (2007, 934) states 
“equity may be well deemed the conductor of law towards a 
state of refinement and perfection.” The idea of equity serving 
as a tool to refining and perfecting society, also suggests that 
equity can serve as an end of government and society. While 
Wilson attributes the creation of government as the agent for 
the will of the people, equity can serve as one of the ends gov-
ernment is designated to achieve.
Judges as Representatives
The second job of judges is to serve as representatives of the will 
of the people. On this front, Wilson identifies three important 
jobs designated for judges. The first is that they should not 
make the law (Wilson 2007, 738). Making the law is the job 
of the legislature. Judges have only the function of interpreting 
the law in light of the Constitution. Wilson (2007, 738) argues 
“In the United States, the judges stand upon the sure basis of 
the constitution: the judicial department is independent of the 
legislature.” A judge can determine the constitutionality of the 
law, and strike it down with the power of judicial review, if and 
only if it is found to be unconstitutional. A judge has no other 
power to strike down a law other than this power, limiting their 
ability to create the law. However, Wilson(2007, 738) argues “In 
many cases, the jurisdiction of the judges of the United States 
is ascertained and secured by the constitution; as to these, the 
power of the judicial is coordinate with that of the legislative 
department.” The coordination between the legislative branch 
and the judiciary was of particular importance to Wilson. Since 
the judiciary serves as the final check on a new law, judges must 
coordinate with lawmakers in order to best serve the needs of 
society, in accordance with the Constitution.1 
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The second role of judges as representatives is that judges 
“should implement ‘principles and rules of genuine policy and 
natural justice’ for the purpose of promoting a true science of 
law” (Wilson 2007, xxiii). According to Wilson, the term “sci-
ence” is viewed as progress in reflection of enlightenment prin-
ciples. For Wilson, the use of precedent is seen as necessary, 
but not in every situation. Each new case and new decision 
improves upon or uses precedent, almost like a science experi-
ment. In science, a result is only deemed legitimate if it can be 
replicated. This is the same for the law. If precedent cannot be 
applied to more than one case that is similar in nature, then the 
decision should be improved upon and changed. Wilson uses 
his knowledge of the natural sciences and applies them to the 
law using the writings of Lord Francis Bacon. Wilson describes 
the science of law while mentioning the importance of Lord 
Bacon in the following:
I think I may venture the position – that in no science 
can richer materials be found, and that, in no science, 
have rich materials been more neglected or abused, 
than in the science of law – particularly of the com-
mon law. Listen to the sentiments of my Lord Bacon, 
in his book on the advancement of learning. It is well 
known, that the vast object of this exalted and most 
comprehensive genius was, to erect a new and lasting 
fabric of philosophy, founded, not on hypothesis or 
conjecture, but on experience and truth. To the ac-
complishment of this design, it was necessary that he 
should previously review, in all its provinces and divi-
sions, the state of learning as it then stood. To do this 
effectually required knowledge and discernment, ex-
quisite and universal; such were happily employed in 
the arduous task. (Wilson 2007, 1026-1027)
The use of science for Wilson is very important in the interpre-
tation, as well as the teaching of the law. Wilson looks towards 
the law, as well as the interpretation of it, as an advancement 
of learning. Applying the science of law is important to the 
overall job of judges, because they are entrusted with clarifying 
the law of the Constitution for the people. The science of law 
serves as a way of improving the existing law, as well as an aid 
in interpreting what the law intends through replication. The 
use of science and the emphasis on replication suggests that 
through the use of scientific principles and reason, a judge can 
better clarify the law, leading to uniformity in the interpreta-
tion of it. If interpretation of the law, and more importantly 
the Constitution, is more uniform, it will be easier to educate 
the people on its meaning. This also supports Wilson’s idea 
that the law and its application is universal in nature, which 
should facilitate, on one hand, the perfection of society and the 
cultivation of American citizens, on the other. For example, if 
similar laws are interpreted differently in two different states, 
then two different lessons are learned by the people. This works 
against Wilson’s national impulse. Therefore, for Wilson, a sci-
entific grounding for precedent is surer than the grounding of 
precedent currently and historically found in the common law.
The science of law also helps to maintain the idea of the ju-
diciary as a pyramid. The courts, according to Wilson (2007, 
945) should resemble a pyramid where there is “a regular, pro-
gressive gradation of jurisdiction.” The gradation of jurisdic-
tion provides options, as well as limits them. The higher up the 
pyramid, the more limited the power of the Court becomes. 
This is helpful in maintaining the boundaries of the Supreme 
Court. Giving the Supreme Court the final authority is po-
tentially dangerous, therefore the pyramid provides limitations 
on the Court’s power.2 The potential danger is seen in the fact 
that the Court is not popularly elected, and is not accountable 
for its decisions. The fear is that an empowered court could 
degenerate into an aristocracy. In addition to this, he states “a 
supreme court prohibits the abuse, and protects the exercise, of 
every inferior judiciary power” (Wilson 2007, 945). The cre-
ation of the United States judicial system allows for the science 
of law to function properly. Each district has its own federal 
court, and appellate court to which the law is interpreted and 
applied. However, the Supreme Court has the ultimate author-
ity, and makes the ultimate decision of whether or not a deci-
sion, or law is constitutional. 
The third responsibility of a judge as representative is that ju-
dicial review should always been textually based (Wilson 2007, 
xxiii). This should be seen as a limitation. Although the power 
of judicial review is an implicit power with the function of 
ascertaining the validity of a statute, Wilson limits this implicit 
power by requiring judge’s decisions involving judicial review 
to be strictly text based. Since the Constitution is the supreme 
law of the land, and is the will of the sovereign people, Wilson 
believes it provides the proper criteria for making this determi-
nation. Wilson (2007, 897) describes judicial review as:
If the validity of a statute or treaty of the United States, 
or of an authority exercised under them, be drawn in 
question, in any suit in the highest court of law or 
equity of a state, in which a decision of the suit could 
be had; and a decision is against their validity – if the 
validity of a statute of any state, or of an authority 
exercised under that state, is, in any suit in such court, 
drawn in question, as repugnant to the constitution, 
treaties or laws of the United States; and a decision is 
in favor of their validity – if the construction of any 
clause of the constitution, of a treaty, of a statute of the 
United States, or of a commission held under them, is, 
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in any suit in such court, drawn in question; and a de-
cision is against the title, right, privilege or exemption, 
specially set up or claimed by either party under such 
clause – a final judgment or decree, in all these cases, 
may, upon a writ of error, be reexamined and affirmed 
or reverse in the supreme court of the United States.
The power of judicial review is used when the Constitution is 
not clear about a certain issue, or if there are conflicting prin-
ciples. Grounding judicial review in text also limits the power 
of the Supreme Court from overstepping their jurisdictional 
boundaries. It also allows for a legitimate check on the acts of 
the legislature. In recognition of this, Hamilton refers to the 
judicial branch as an “intermediate body between the people 
and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the 
latter within the limits assigned to their authority” (Federal-
ist #78, 404). Maintaining the proper balance between the 
three branches of government constitutes a significant part of a 
judge’s responsibilities. A judge wants to promote a true science 
of law, and reach natural justice according to Wilson, therefore 
the power of judicial review works towards that goal, by refin-
ing the wants and needs of the people, by limiting them with 
the Constitution. Hamilton, picking up on this point, goes 
further and says “the interpretation of the laws is the proper 
and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is in fact, 
and must be, regarded by the judges as fundamental law. It 
therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as 
the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legisla-
tive body” (Federalist #78, 404). Judicial review stands as the 
strongest check against legislative encroachment, and aides in 
the enforcement of boundaries between these two branches.
Judges as Educators
The third function of a judge is to serve as an educator of the 
sovereign people. Judges are entrusted with this education, 
because they are seen as knowledgeable individuals, enlight-
ened by studying the law and what Wilson refers to as the sci-
ence of law. In the example that the people ask Congress to 
do something that is outside the government’s derived power, 
or is inconsistent with the ends of government, the Court has 
the job of recognizing that this is unconstitutional, and has 
the job of educating the people on why what they are asking is 
inconsistent with the ends of government as designated by the 
Constitution. Wilson (2007, 447-48) describes a judge as “He 
who is qualified to teach, is well qualified to judge; and he, who 
is well qualified to judge, is well qualified to teach.” Accord-
ing to Wilson, a judge has the social responsibility of bettering 
society. A judge does this by educating the people on the law 
through their decisions. 
When interpreting the Constitution, judges use what Wil-
son (2007, 819) refers to as “common sense.” This “common 
sense” is informed by Wilson’s concept of the moral sentiment, 
which is used to resolve the tension between natural right prin-
ciples and common law principles. Wilson (2007, 458) states 
that when making decisions, a judge must “pry into the secret 
recesses of the human heart, and become well acquainted with 
the whole mortal world, that they may discover the abstract 
reason of all laws.” This implies two important concepts for 
Wilson. When he refers to “the secret recesses of the human 
heart,” he is referring to the moral sentiment. Wilson (2007, 
512) states that the moral sentiment “from its very nature, is in-
tended to regulate and control all our other powers. It governs 
our passions as well as our actions.” For Wilson (2007,512), 
the concept of the moral sentiment is “In short; if we had not 
the faculty of perceiving certain things in conduct to be right, 
and others to be wrong; and of perceiving our obligation to do 
what is right, and not to do what is wrong; we should not be 
moral and accountable beings.” Therefore, according to Wil-
son, the moral sentiment serves as our internal check on right 
and wrong, placed in the hearts of individuals by God.
Another way of conceptualizing the moral sense is as conscience. 
This is an important quality of a judge, because judges require 
the proper understanding of right and wrong while making de-
cisions. According to Wilson (2007, 514), “His conscience or 
moral sense determines the end, which he ought to pursue; and 
he has intuitive evidence that his end is good: but the means 
of attaining this end must be determined by reason.” Reason 
is the second part of Wilson’s understanding of the “common 
sense,” as well as judicial decision making. Once a judge has 
consulted with the moral sense to determine what is right or 
just, they must use reason in order to execute what the moral 
sense is telling them to do. Wilson (2007, 514) states “Thus, 
though good and ill, right and wrong are ultimately perceived 
by the moral sense, yet reason assists its operations, and, in 
many instances, strengthens and extends its influence.” Reason 
and the moral sense work together to find the best possible out-
come for a situation. The moral sense cannot act without rea-
son, because reason provides what the moral sense cannot. Wil-
son (2007, 514-515) states “reason serves to illustrate, to prove, 
to extend, to apply what our moral sense has already suggested 
to us, concerning just and unjust, proper and improper, right 
and wrong,” while in addition, “reason contributes to ascertain 
the exactness, and to discover and correct the mistakes, of the 
moral sense… It considers the relations of actions, and traces 
them to the remotest consequences.” However, this is not to 
suggest that reason is superior to the moral sense. According 
to Wilson (2007, 519), “the ultimate ends of human actions, 
can never, in any case, be accounted for by reason.” However, 
the fault of reason is that it “presents false appearances to our 
moral sense” (Wilson 2007, 518). Although it may seem that 
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reasoning can be used to solve an issue in the natural sciences, 
in the science of law, the moral sentiment is required. Accord-
ing to Wilson (2007,517), “the dictates of reason are neither 
more general, nor more uniform, nor more certain, nor more 
commanding, than the dictates of the moral sense.” Therefore, 
it is important, given the strengths and weaknesses of both the 
moral sense and reason separately, that the two work together. 
According to Wilson’s conception of the moral sense, it 
would seem that using a pure science of law if inadequate 
when making decisions. Wilson believes good judges need 
the combination of the science of law and the moral sense 
in order to arrive at the right decision. Wilson (2007, 469) 
asserts “Truth may, indeed, by reasoning, be rendered evident 
to the understanding; but it cannot reach the heart, unless by 
means of the imagination.” This suggests that science is silent 
on the question of right and wrong. However, the moral sense 
also cannot be the only influence on judicial decision making 
either. Wilson (2007, 470) states “Laws may be promulgated 
by reason and conscience, the divine monitors within us.” 
Both coordinate with one another in order to arrive at a just 
and equitable decision. The moral sense, without the use of 
reason appears to have no restrictions. This tension between 
the moral sense and the science of law is solved by Wilson’s 
conception of judgment. 
The first important part of Wilson’s conception of judgment 
is reflection. Wilson believes that experience, as well as reflec-
tion on the experience of others is a very important influence 
on judicial decision making. Wilson (2007, 586) describes the 
action of reflection: This way: “By this power, the mind makes 
its own operations the subject of its attention, and views and 
examines them on every side.” While reasoning and the moral 
sense both used when making decisions, reflection serves as the 
best restriction against the passions of the moral sense. Wil-
son (2007, 586) states “how utterly impossible is it to make 
any clear and distinct observations on our faculties of thought, 
unless the passions, as well as the imagination, be silent and 
still.” Once reflection has restricted the overbearing passions 
the moral sense can sometimes present, one can apply the sci-
ence of law and come to a decision that is consistent with the 
dictates of natural justice. Reflection allows for the discovery 
of truth, and therefore the right and best answer for a given 
situation. 
A second component of Wilson’s conception of judgment is 
the relationship between judgment and memory. According 
to Wilson (2007, 599), “Judgments are intuitive, as well as 
discursive, founded on truths that are self-evident, as well as 
that are deduced from demonstration, or from reasoning of a 
less certain kind. The former, or intuitive judgments, may, in 
the strictest sense, be called the judgments of nature.” When 
Wilson refers to demonstration, he is referring to experience, 
or memory. According to Wilson, judgment and memory are 
mutual assistants. Wilson (2007, 597) states “Memory furnish-
es the materials which judgment selects, adjusts, and arranges. 
Those materials selected, adjusted and arranged are more at 
the call of memory than before: for it is a well known fact, 
that those things, which are disposed most methodically and 
connected most naturally, are the most distinct, as well as the 
most lasting objects of remembrance: hence, in discourse, the 
utility as well as beauty of order.” Without memory, judges 
would not have the ability to collect and organize information 
in a particular case. Memory also allows for reflection, not only 
on personal experience, but also on evidence and precedent. 
Judgment uses memory in order to make affirmative or denial 
distinctions. This ability is keen when relying upon the moral 
sense for a scale of right and wrong. Wilson (2007, 599) de-
scribes judgment as “an important operation of the mind; and 
it is employed upon the material of perception and knowledge. 
It is generally described to be, that act of the mind, by which 
one thing is affirmed or denied of another.” However, he be-
lieves this definition is too limited, while at the same time too 
extensive. Wilson sees judgment as limited, because it can only 
be expressed by either affirmation or denial. There is no true 
gray area. He believes it is too extensive because it includes 
testimony as a conjuncture to judgment, when they are two 
completely different concepts with different implications. 
Judgment, in addition to memory, requires reasoning in order 
to function.
The third component of judgment for Wilson is the connec-
tion between judgment and reason. Wilson (2007, 600) states 
that “with the power of judging, the power of reasoning is 
very neatly connected.” Wilson sees judgment and reasoning 
as corresponding with one another in order to reach the right 
decision. This coincides with Aristotle’s practical judgment 
(See Ethics, 1142a-1142b). According to Wilson (2007, 600), 
“reasoning is strictly the process, by which we pass from one 
judgment to another, which is the consequence of it. In all 
reasoning, there must be one proposition, which is inferred, 
and another, at least, from which the inference is made.” Rea-
soning is the bridge between memory and judgment. Reason-
ing allows for judgment to make the necessary connections, 
and helps to organize and analyze the information contained 
within memories. This organization allows for a judge to think 
about memories in a restrained form. This restrained form is 
less likely to be overly passionate, and can aid a judge in his/
her decision making in a clear and logical sense. However, Wil-
son (2007, 600) points out that “reason, as well as judgment, 
has truth and falsehood for its objects: both proceed from evi-
dence; both are accompanied with belief.” Therefore, accord-
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ing to Wilson, reasoning and judgment cannot stand alone. 
Both have the ability to reach the wrong conclusion. Wilson’s 
solution to this is the moral sense. Wilson (2007, 803) states 
“Our knowledge of moral philosophy, of natural jurispru-
dence, of the law of nations, must ultimately depend, for its 
first principles, on the evidence and information of the moral 
sense.” The combination of the moral sense with judgment 
and reason is very important in understanding and interpret-
ing the Constitution. According to Wilson (2007, 615), the 
Constitution contains common sense moral principles. The 
Constitution does not explicitly state these principles, but it is 
required of a judge to identify them using reason. One of the 
strongest common sense moral principles contained within the 
Constitution is the protection of the innocent. Wilson (2007, 
627-28) states “the moral sense restrains us from harming the 
innocent: it teaches us, that the innocent have a right to be se-
cure from harm. These are two great principles, which prepare 
us for society; and with regard to them, the moral sense discov-
ers peculiar inflexibility: it dictates, that we should submit to 
any distress or danger, rather than procure our safety and relief 
of violence upon an innocent person.” The Constitution deals 
with common sense moral principles in a limited approach. It 
places restraints upon individuals in society through the use of 
a common sense. Each individual has a common, moral senti-
ment that tells them what is right and wrong placed in them 
by God. The Constitution, as well as the governmental institu-
tions it creates, is intended to inform the people on this moral 
sentiment, and aid them in discovering it. The Constitution 
cannot simply be looked at as the will of the people, but as the 
will of the people that embodies and presumes and argument 
on certain moral principles. 
Discussion
Having distilled Wilson’s theory of how judges make decisions, 
it can now be placed alongside the other schools of thought. 
Although each has similar qualities to Wilson’s thought, each 
has significant differences as well. The first school is the natu-
ral law. According to the natural law, law and morality cannot 
be divorced from one another. The natural law also provides 
principles for how one ought to live, based on substantive 
moral reasoning that defines right and wrong. The natural law 
is universal, but not in the same sense as Wilson understands 
universality. Arkes (1990) and George (1999) attempt to in-
corporate Thomistic natural law principles into a theory of ju-
risprudence, where Wilson grounds a theory of jurisprudence 
on scientific principles. Since the natural law argument focuses 
on the Thomistic idea of right and wrong, Wilson does not fit 
within its confines. Wilson believes that God has placed within 
each individual the dictates of right and wrong, he uses com-
mon sense, the moral sentiment, and reasoning rather than a 
strict reliance on the divine. Wilson focuses on the common 
sense, reaching inside ourselves for the dictates of morality. The 
traditional natural law argument, in contrast, argues that the 
source of natural law is external to man, in the form of a divine 
God. For Wilson, the natural law does not provide a thorough 
basis for decision making, but instead creates a very limited 
understanding of right and wrong based on divine reasoning. 
The second school is natural right. According to natural rights 
theorists, if a law is against natural rights, judges should reject it 
as government has the job of protecting the inalienable rights of 
individuals. Natural rights theorists also believe that legitimacy 
in government is gained by the proper protection of rights, 
not the consent of the governed. Barnett (2004, 30) states “a 
duty to obey the law cannot be grounded on the consent of the 
governed when there has been anything less than unanimous 
consent and that, obviously, no government legal system can 
claim this degree of consent.” According to the natural rights 
argument, the job of government is to secure individual rights, 
unless everyone, unanimously, can all agree that government 
does not have the means to execute a given action. Barnett goes 
on to claim that the phrase “We the People,” is a fiction, as well 
as the idea of popular sovereignty itself. This idea is in direct 
tension with Wilson’s idea of popular sovereignty. Wilson’s po-
litical thought focuses heavily on the importance of consent, 
as well as the people as principle sovereign. Wilson agrees that 
the government, as an agent of the people, and as part of their 
social responsibility should protect individual’s natural rights 
and improve society. This implies a trust between the sovereign 
people that the government will actively protect their natural 
rights. For Wilson, the government is simultaneously empow-
ered and limited by this trust. For Barnett and other natural 
rights theorists, the government is limited. Natural rights theo-
rists also believe that popular attachment is based on what an 
individual’s conscience dictates. If an individual believes a law, 
or the government is not protecting them properly, they have 
the right to deny/disobey that law. Wilson would disagree with 
this concept of political attachment, given the multiple provi-
sions provided in the Constitution to ensure that the laws cre-
ated and passed by the legislature will be good laws. However, 
Wilson would agree that conscience is a necessary factor in de-
termining right and wrong. Wilson’s moral sentiment, based 
on common sense principles, provides guidance on right and 
wrong, in the same way individual conscience does. 
The third school is of the common law in America. According 
to Stoner (1992), the common law requires judges to make 
decisions using prudence and precedent. A heavy reliance on 
precedent allows for judges to make decisions based on the pri-
or decisions of other judges, while accounting for new evidence 
presented within a case. Wilson agrees with the use of prec-
edent, but does not place a heavy reliance upon it. The com-
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mon law is adaptable, changing with each generation to fit the 
needs of the people. The common law is unwritten, therefore 
allowing for flexibility. For Wilson, the common law does not 
provide a solid basis for judicial decision making. Instead, Wil-
son favors grounding the Constitution and its interpretation 
on scientific principles. Science is proven. The common law 
is dynamic and unstable. Although the common law has been 
perfected over time, science allows for replication. The com-
mon law does not rely on scientific reasoning, and is therefore 
nonreplicable. This creates tension within the law, and there-
fore a problem with popular attachment to the law. This ten-
sion is commonly seen within interstate law. If a given action is 
legal in one state, but illegal in another, the people can become 
confused, therefore undermining the ability of the sovereign 
people to perform their responsibilities. If the law is universal, 
and grounded on scientific principles, it will be more solidified, 
and therefore the people will be more likely to consent to it. 
Wilson’s position on judicial decision making blends natural 
law and natural rights principles, based on a scientific ground-
ing of the law. Wilson’s science of law is ultimately a scientifi-
cally-informed understanding of precedent and judicial reason-
ing. Where the three competing interpretations of how judges 
should decide go wrong is in viewing the act of decision making 
as having to fall exclusively into a single intellectual camp. This 
requirement is inconsistent with what is generally regarded as 
the fundamental starting point to the study of American po-
litical thought. A single body of philosophy cannot accurately 
explain or describe the American political thinking as Ameri-
cans draw on multiple, often contradicting, intellectual tradi-
tions (Gibson 2007, 130-164; Gibson 2006, 7-63).Wilson’s 
multi-dimensional concept of popular sovereignty, as well as 
his understanding of what judges should have recourse to when 
making decisions serves as the perfect example of how multiple 
influences affect the political thought of our Founding Fathers.
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Endnotes
1 Wilson was also a strong advocate for a Council of Revision, which 
would create a larger check on the legislative power when creating 
laws by determining whether or not a particular piece of legislature 
was consistent with the Constitution. Having this check would en-
sure that no law passed by the legislature would be unconstitutional. 
However, the Council of Revision was eventually rejected by the del-
egates at the Constitutional Convention.
2 This limitation on the Supreme Court’s power is best seen in the 
case of Marbury v. Madison 1803. In Marbury, the Supreme Court 
denied cert because Marbury had filed for original jurisdiction. The 
Supreme Court only has the power of appellate jurisdiction, therefore 
making Marbury’s claim outside the sphere of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction.
